

Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED

SEP 16 1977

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

No. **77-425**

PAUL H. GIBSON, SHERIFF OF GUILFORD COUNTY

Petitioner,

v.

VOULYNNE SMALL,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

W. B. Trevorrow, County Attorney
William I. Daisy, Asst. County Attorney
Guilford County Attorneys Office
Post Office Box 3427
Greensboro, North Carolina 27402
Telephone: (919) 373-3852

Perry C. Henson
Ronald G. Baker
Henson & Donahue
Post Office Box 3525
Greensboro, North Carolina 27402
Telephone: (919) 275-0587

Counsel for Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
AUTHORITIES CITED.	ii
OPINIONS BELOW	2
JURISDICTION	2
QUESTIONS PRESENTED.	2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES INVOLVED	4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.	5
REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT.	9
CONCLUSION	27

APPENDIX

1. Decision of the District Court . . A-1
2. Decision of the Court of Appeals . A-10
3. Order of the Court of Appeals
denying the petition for a
rehearing. A-11
4. Order of the United States
Supreme Court granting the
Petition for Certiorari,
Vacating the Court of
Appeals' decision and
remanding for recon-
sideration A-12
5. Decision of the Court of
Appeals on remand. A-13

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

AUTHORITIES CITED

Page

CASES:

U.S. Supreme Court

<u>Bishop v. Wood</u> , 426 U.S. 341 (1976)	10, 14,
<u>Board of Regents v. Roth</u> , 408 U.S. 564 (1972)	15, 18 11, 15,
<u>Codd v. Velger</u> , 429 U.S. ____ (1977)	19 18, 19, 22, 25, 26
<u>Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.</u> , 418 U.S. 323 (1974)	20
<u>Goss v. Lopez</u> , 419 U.S. 565 (1975)	13
<u>Marcy v. Brewer</u> , 408 U.S. 471 (1972)	13
<u>Paul v. Davis</u> , 424 U.S. 693 (1976)	11, 12, 13, 14
<u>Perry v. Sinderman</u> , 408 U.S. 593 (1972)	15
<u>Wisconsin v. Constantineau</u> , 400 U.S. 433 (1971)	13

U.S. Court of Appeals

<u>Sylvan Beach, Inc. v. Koch</u> , 140 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1944)	23
<u>United States v. Jacques</u> , 463 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1972)	26

N.C. Supreme Court

<u>Still v. Lance</u> , 275 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971)	10
--	----

Page

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution	4
---	---

STATUTES:

42 U.S.C. §1983 (1974)	4
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-101(1) (1974)	5, 10

RULES AND REGULATIONS:

Rule 52, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure	26
Guilford County Sheriff's Department General Order No. 71-2.	5

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

No. _____

PAUL H. GIBSON, SHERIFF OF GUILFORD COUNTY

Petitioner,

v.

VOULYNNE SMALL,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Paul H. Gibson, Sheriff of Guilford County prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgments of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit entered in the above-entitled cause, the last of which was entered on June 22, 1977 (Court of Appeals' opinion on remand, *infra*, page A-13).

The United States Supreme Court previously granted a writ of certiorari in this case (*Gibson v. Small*, ___ U.S. ___, 51 L. Ed. 2d 578 (1977), Supreme Court Case No. 76-941), and the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was vacated and

the matter remanded for further consideration in light of *Codd v. Velger*, 429 U.S. ___, 51 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1977).

OPINIONS BELOW

The first opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 541 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1976) and is included in the Appendix beginning at page A-10. The order of the United States Supreme Court granting the petitioner's previous petition for a writ of certiorari is reported at ___ U.S. ___, 97 S. Ct. 882, 51 L. Ed. 2d 578 (1977), and is included in the Appendix beginning at page A-12. The opinion of the Court of Appeals on remand from the United States Supreme Court is unpublished and is included in the Appendix beginning at page A-13.

The opinion of the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina is included in the Appendix beginning at page A-1.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on June 22, 1977. The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. §1254 (1) (1966).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether, in the absence of any claim that a public employer's termination of an employee was motivated by a desire to curtail or penalize the employee's exercise of constitutionally protected rights, and in the absence of any

claim by the employee of a valid expectation of continued employment under applicable state law, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires the employee to be afforded notice and a hearing prior to termination, regardless of the circumstances surrounding and the reasons for the termination?

2. Whether a deputy sheriff who concededly had no property interest in her appointment as a deputy, is deprived of "liberty" under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when her appointment is terminated without notice or hearing for violating a General Order of the Sheriff that off-duty deputies conduct themselves in a manner above reproach and so as not to discredit the law enforcement profession, where the conduct which the Sheriff felt violated the General Order was such that it might damage the deputy's reputation?

3. Whether a deputy sheriff's interest in her reputation constitutes a protected "liberty" interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution where there are adequate remedies under state law for damage to reputation?

4. What constitutes a publication of the reasons for an employee's termination sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?

5. Whether a deputy sheriff, who has been terminated for reasons which might damage her reputation and character and those reasons were published, may recover damages absent proof of actual injury to her character or the actual

foreclosure of other job opportunities and actual loss resulting therefrom?

6. Whether the District Court erred in rendering judgment on a theory not raised by the parties in their pleadings or proof or litigated by the parties by consent, and whether the Court of Appeals erred in making additional findings of fact necessary to support the District Court's judgment and then affirming the judgment on two separate occasions?

7. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of the District Court where the District Court did not find that the reasons for the deputy sheriff's dismissal were false and where the truth or falsity of the charges was not even in issue?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES INVOLVED

1. The relevant portion of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

"Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:

"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any right, privileges, or immunities secured by

the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."

3. The relevant portion of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-103(10) (1974) provides:

"Each Sheriff and Register of Deeds elected by the people has the exclusive right to hire, discharge, and supervise the employees in his office."

4. The relevant portion of General Order No. 71-2 of the Guilford County Sheriff's Department provides:

"No member of the Sheriff's Department on duty or not shall act in any manner to bring reproach upon the Department, or Guilford County. Each deputy is to live a quiet, civil, and orderly life, standing as an example to all citizens. He shall not disturb the peace, become engaged in a brawl, fight, or assault, whereby discredit is caused the Law Enforcement Profession. . .Disciplinary action shall be effected immediately by any commanding officer of the Department."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The plaintiff-respondent Voulynn Small, a black female former trainee deputy sheriff of Guilford County, North Carolina, filed an action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, Greensboro Division, wherein she alleged, in a verified complaint, that she had been employed as a deputy sheriff of Guilford County on January 8, 1973, and had then been summarily dismissed without notice, hearing or statement of reasons on February 9,

1973, and further alleged that her dismissal by the defendant-petitioner Paul H. Gibson, Sheriff of Guilford County, was motivated by her race and color, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000E-2(a)(1). The defendant-petitioner, in his answer, denied that the respondent's dismissal was in any way racially motivated but, to the contrary, alleged that the termination resulted from the respondent's violation of the Code of Conduct: the performance standards expected of deputy sheriffs of Guilford County. The petitioner further alleged in his answer that the dismissal of the respondent was the result of her drinking alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication and being in a motel with one or more married men who were police officers attending the same training school as the respondent, which conduct was reported to the petitioner by another black deputy sheriff.

At the trial of the case the respondent presented evidence in support of her allegations that her dismissal was based on race. The respondent also testified concerning the reasons which the petitioner had given to her, in his private office, for her dismissal. The respondent put on evidence to the effect that her character and reputation in the community were good. She further put on evidence tending to show that since her dismissal she had submitted a number of job applications and that most of those applications had not resulted in a position being offered to her. Before she rested her case, however, the respondent offered no evidence that any prospective employer had been informed by either the petitioner or anyone else of the fact of her dismissal or of the reasons for her dismissal; she offered no evidence whatsoever

that her reputation or standing or associations in the community had been affected in any way; and she offered no evidence that the petitioner publicized, either before or at the time of her dismissal, any statements concerning, or reasons for, the dismissal which would have tended to tarnish her reputation or damage her standing in the community. The respondent's only evidence concerning any publication was that the petitioner told her the reasons for her dismissal in his private office, and that at some time after the termination, petitioner told respondent's father the reasons for respondent's termination.

The petitioner, in turn, put on evidence to show that the respondent's dismissal was totally unrelated to race but rather resulted from conduct on her part which had been reported to him and which he felt violated General Order No. 72-2.

At the conclusion of the trial, even though the District Judge made no finding that the reasons for the respondent's dismissal were false, and made no finding that there had been any publication, either before or after her firing, of the reasons for the respondent's dismissal, and even though there was no finding that plaintiff's character or reputation or standing in the community had been affected in any way and even though there was no finding that any job opportunities had been foreclosed in any manner, and even though he found that the respondent's dismissal was totally unrelated to race, the District Court entered judgment for the respondent. In the District Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Opinion, the Court found that:

"Plaintiff's allegations of racial discrimination in her discharge is not supported by the

evidence. It is undisputed that the plaintiff was discharged for allegations of intoxication and immoral conduct, which are racially neutral standards in themselves." (Conclusion of Law No. 4) (p. A-6).

Then, even though the issue was not raised in the pleadings or addressed at trial by arguments or evidence presented to the Court, the District Court ruled that:

"1. Since the plaintiff was discharged for alleged intoxication and immoral conduct, her termination was based on reasons which would tend to damage her standing and associations in her community by tarnishing her reputation and good name. Termination for these reasons would also impose on plaintiff a stigma or employment record that would foreclose her freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. Therefore the plaintiff was entitled to notice of the reasons for discharge and the opportunity for a hearing to refute the charges." (p. A-5).

The District Court then awarded the plaintiff back pay.

The petitioner then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In his appeal, the petitioner contended that as a matter of law the respondent had no expectation of continued employment and was not entitled to notice and a hearing prior to dismissal. The petitioner further argued that even if the reasons for the respondent's dismissal would tend

to tarnish her reputation, that the District Court did not find as a fact that those reasons had been published and that therefore its decision could not stand on the basis. The petitioner further contended that it was error for the District Court to decide the case on a theory not presented by the pleadings, evidence or argument of counsel. The Court of Appeals, in a per curiam opinion, found as a fact that the petitioner had published the reasons for the respondent's dismissal and therefore affirmed the decision of the District Court, basing its decision on Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), which was decided after this case was argued in the Court of Appeals. The petitioner then timely petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for a rehearing, en banc, of the appeal, which petition was denied in an order entered October 21, 1976.

Thereafter, the petitioner petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari to review the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. In an order entered February 28, 1977 the United States Supreme Court entered an order granting a writ of certiorari, ___ U.S. ___, 97 S. Ct. 882, 51 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1977) vacating the Court of Appeals judgment and remanding the case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. ___, 51 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1977). Upon remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its previous decision in an opinion filed June 22, 1977.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

THE RESPONDENT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO NOTICE AND A HEARING PRIOR TO HER TERMINATION FROM THE POSITION

OF DEPUTY SHERIFF OF GUILFORD COUNTY BECAUSE SHE HAD NO "PROPERTY" INTEREST IN HER POSITION.

In his argument in the Court of Appeals and in his brief submitted thereto, counsel for the respondent conceded that the respondent had no expectation of continued employment with the Sheriff's Department of Guilford County. North Carolina General Statute 153A-103(1) clearly gives a Sheriff the unfettered discretion "to hire, discharge, and supervise" those persons he has appointed to be his deputies. The North Carolina Supreme Court, in Still v. Lance, 275 N.C. 254, 183 S.E.2d 403 (1971), held that an expectation of continued employment in North Carolina can exist only if the employer, by statute or contract, has actually granted some form of guarantee. No such guarantee was present in this case. In fact, the evidence clearly showed that a newly appointed deputy in Guilford County was not even considered to be a permanent deputy until he or she had been with the Department for six months. The respondent here had only been with the Department for one month at the time of the termination of her appointment. Therefore, under the reasoning of Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), the respondent had no expectation of continuing employment and no "property interest" in her position as a deputy sheriff of Guilford County.

II.

THE WORD "LIBERTY" IN THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION DOES NOT ENCOMPASS THE PROTECTION OF REPUTATIONAL

INTERESTS OF A CITIZEN OR PUBLIC EMPLOYEE.

In the landmark case of Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, discussed the meaning of the word "liberty" as it appears in the Due Process Clause. The Court found in that case, however, ". . . [N]o suggestion whatever that the respondent's interest in his 'good name, reputation, honor or integrity'" was at stake. Board of Regents v. Roth, supra. Thus, the opinion in the Roth case can only be dicta as applied to other cases involving a citizen's reputational interests (whether or not the citizen happens to be a public employee).

This Court addressed such a case in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). In this case, a photograph of Davis, bearing his name, was included in a flyer of "active shoplifters" which was distributed by police chiefs to area merchants in Louisville, Kentucky. Prior to the preparation of the flyer, Davis had been arrested on a charge of shoplifting. However, at the time that the flyer was published and distributed, Davis had not been tried on, or convicted of the charge. Shortly after the distribution of the flyer, the shoplifting charge against Davis was finally dismissed. Davis, alleging that the flyer would inhibit him from entering business establishments for fear of being suspected of shoplifting and would seriously impair his future employment opportunities, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 claiming that he had been deprived of "liberty" without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

This Court, in holding that the trial court properly dismissed Davis' complaint, stated that:

"Respondent in this case cannot assert denial of any right vouchsafed to him by the State and thereby protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. That being the case, petitioner's defamatory publications, however seriously they may have harmed respondent's reputation, did not deprive him of any 'liberty' or 'property' interest protected by the Due Process Clause."
Paul v. Davis, supra, at 420 (L. Ed. 2d)

The present case presents a situation where the respondent's interest in her employment, taken alone, did not constitute a "property" interest under the Due Process Clause, and her interest in her good name and reputation, standing alone, did not constitute a "liberty" interest under the Due Process Clause. The petitioner could have terminated the respondent's employment without stating any reason for the termination and she would have been entitled to notice and a hearing. Further, the petitioner could have defamed the respondent in a situation where the loss of employment was not involved without affording her notice and an opportunity to be heard.

The damage claimed by the respondent in the present case does not differ in kind or quality from the damage claimed by the plaintiff in the Paul case. In

this case and in the Paul case, the sole legally cognizable injury was injury to reputation. In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), while the Court noted that suspension of a student from school based on charges of misconduct could cause damage to the reputation of the student, the Court found that all children in the State of Ohio had the right, under Ohio law, to attend school. In Marcy v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the parolees were granted the right by the state to remain at liberty as long as the terms of their parole were not violated. In Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), the Court was faced with a situation where the individual's right to purchase and consume alcohol was terminated concurrent with the alleged damage to her reputation. In each of those cases, the plaintiff's reputational damage occurred in conjunction with the deprivation of some right guaranteed under state law. In the present case, however, the respondent has been deprived of no legal right granted by state or federal law. She had no legal claim on a job as a deputy sheriff in Guilford County and no "property" interest in the job. She was subject to termination at any time for any reason and had no claim to any expectancy of continued employment. It is submitted that she is in precisely the same position as was the plaintiff in the Paul case. By virtue of allegedly defamatory statements made by a public official, she claims that her reputation has been injured.

It is submitted that it would be inconsistent and anomalous to hold that the respondent in this case has a claim for relief for infringement of a constitutionally protected "liberty" interest and that the plaintiff in the Paul case did not. The only fact distinguishing this case from the

Paul case is that here the respondent's appointment to a job in which she had no protected "property" interest was revoked. It is respectfully submitted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not, within the ambit of "liberty" or "property," protect reputational interests. The respondent in this case has been denied no right guaranteed to her by the State or by federal law which would therefore be protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Further, it was stated in Bishop v. Wood, *supra* that:

The federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies. We must accept the harsh fact that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in the day-to-day administration of our affairs. The United States Constitution cannot feasibly be construed to require federal judicial review for every such error. In the absence of any claim that the public employer was motivated by a desire to curtail or to penalize the exercise of an employee's constitutionally protected rights, we must presume that official action was regular and, if erroneous can best be corrected in other ways. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions." Bishop v. Wood, *supra*, at 693 (L. Ed. 2d)

If the method and manner in which the respondent was terminated was ill-advised and improper, even then it is neither necessary nor proper for the Federal Courts to provide a forum and remedy for any alleged damage suffered by the respondent. Adequate remedies are already provided in the state courts for any damage which the respondent may have suffered to her reputation or standing in the community. This case presents no more and no less than an action for defamation of character which could have been filed in the state courts.

For all of the above reasons, it is submitted that, first of all, this is a case of first impression which should be decided by this Court, and secondly, if the language in Roth, Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), and Bishop v. Wood represents the state of the law with respect to "liberty" interests, then such holdings are in conflict with the principles stated in Paul v. Davis and merit reconsideration and clarification by this Court.

III.

EVEN IF THE RESPONDENT'S REPUTATIONAL INTERESTS WERE PROTECTED UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, THERE WAS NO PUBLICATION OF THE REASONS FOR THE PLAINTIFF'S DISMISSAL SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A DEPRIVATION OF RESPONDENT'S "LIBERTY" UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE.

This Court has not, to date, defined what constitutes a "publication" sufficient to invade a person's "liberty" interest, and thereby invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Other than the evidence that, at some time after respondent's dismissal, the petitioner, at respondent's father's request, told respondent's father the reasons for her dismissal, the only evidence concerning publication in this case was the following question and answer:

QUESTION (by plaintiff's counsel): "And you have told, have you not, under oath in the pleadings here and to me and to anyone who has come to you and inquired about why Miss Small was let go, you have told she was let go on account of drinking and on account of being in a motel room with men?"

ANSWER (by Paul H. Gibson, Sheriff of Guilford County): "Drinking and in the company of two married men and being in the car."

In the first place, it is not evident from that question and answer that anyone other than the respondent's father was ever told the reasons for the revocation of the respondent's appointment. The only publications affirmatively shown by that question and answer were such publications as occurred during the pendency of this lawsuit. In any event, however, it is clear that there was no public pronouncement of the reasons for the respondent's dismissal either at the time of her discharge or at any time thereafter. There was no evidence that the petitioner's statements were ever printed in the newspapers. There was no evidence that the reasons for the respondent's dismissal were general knowledge in the community. There was no evidence of communication of the reasons for the respondent's dismissal to any

prospective employer of the respondent. The most that the respondent's evidence tended to show was that she was dismissed at one point in time and then at some later point in time one or more persons may have been told the reasons for her discharge. There was no "public posting" concerning the respondent or anything of that sort. There was no evidence whatsoever that the respondent's character or reputation was injured or damaged in any respect. Therefore, it is submitted that, as a matter of law, there was no "publication" of the reasons for the respondent's dismissal sufficient to invade any "liberty" interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

IV.

THE RESPONDENT WAS ERRONEOUSLY AWARDED SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGES WITHOUT ANY PROOF OF ACTUAL INJURY TO HER REPUTATION OR STANDING IN THE COMMUNITY AND WITHOUT PROOF OF ANY JOB OPPORTUNITIES BEING AFFECTED AND WITHOUT ANY PROOF OF ANY ACTUAL LOSS.

When a governmental employee having a "property" interest in his job is improperly terminated, i.e., without notice and a hearing, there is no difficulty in ascertaining his damages. Obviously, the employee should be entitled to back pay because he has been wrongfully deprived of his job. The situation is different, however, where the employee has no "property" interest in the job, but is allegedly entitled to damages because his "liberty" interests have been invaded. In such a case, the injury is not the loss of a job. The employee had no legal claim of entitlement to the job. The injury, rather, stems from the creation and dissemination of

a false and defamatory impression about the employee in connection with the discharge. Codd v. Velger, ___ U.S. ___, 51 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1977). In such a case, he has not been wrongfully deprived of his job but instead his character and reputation have been wrongfully damaged. In this situation, back pay is not the proper measure of damages. It is submitted that no damages may be awarded in cases such as this unless the plaintiff proves actual injury to his reputation and actual loss.

In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioner could have fired the respondent without giving a reason and would have incurred no legal liability, Bishop v. Wood, supra, regardless of how much difficulty the respondent had finding other employment. That being the case, it is submitted that the respondent should not be allowed recovery where the reasons for her dismissal were communicated to one or more persons unless she can show that her reputation has actually suffered damage and/or job opportunities have actually been affected or foreclosed.

In Justice Stevens dissenting opinion in Codd v. Velger, supra, it is stated that:

"Although the plaintiff does not have the burden of proving that he was discharged for a false reason, if he claims that the discharge deprived him of liberty, he does have the burden of proving that he was stigmatized.

. . .

The District Court found that unfavorable information from respondent's police record reached a prospective employer in only one instance. In that instance, a private employer was allowed to see the file with respondent's

permission. The private employer then discharged the plaintiff, who was on probationary status. The District Court expressly found that no information was released to any government agency to which respondent had applied. (Citations omitted). Thus, as far as the past effects of the unfavorable file are concerned, we have only the finding that one employer discharged respondent on the basis of the information. This does not in itself constitute a "stigma" as that term is used in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564." 51 L. Ed. 2d at 102-103 (Emphasis added).

Further, in the Codd case, the majority opinion noted that the trial judge found that the plaintiff had not proved that he had been stigmatized (51 L. Ed. 2d at 95). It is respectfully submitted that before a plaintiff in a case such as this may recover substantial damages, there must be proof of actual injury and actual damage. The record here, however, is totally devoid of any such proof. In fact, all of the evidence was precisely to the contrary. At the trial of this case (which occurred some two years after the respondent's dismissal), Voulyne Small presented three character witnesses, all of whom testified that her character and reputation were excellent. Further, she failed to show that the reasons for her dismissal had been communicated to even one prospective employer or that any job opportunity had been affected by her dismissal. The trial judge did not find that her character or reputation had been damaged or that any job possibilities had been affected. If a plaintiff may recover damages on the showing made by the

respondent in this case, then proof of injury and damage is not an element of such cases. It is respectfully submitted that Justice Stevens correctly stated the law when he said that plaintiff "does have the burden of proving that he was stigmatized" and it is further submitted that the respondent in this case totally failed to meet that burden.

The situation presented here is not dissimilar to that presented in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) in which it was held that, under the facts of that case in a defamation action under State law, it was not proper to permit recovery of presumed damages absent a showing of actual injury, or at least knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth by the person uttering the defamation. If that is the law with regard to State law defamation actions, it is not at all clear why a party, in what amounts to a federal defamation action, should be allowed a recovery upon a lesser showing. As noted above, all of the evidence in this case was to the effect that the respondent's character and reputation in the community was excellent and this testimony spanned a period of years both before and after her discharge. Further, the evidence failed to show that respondent's discharge and the reasons therefore had been communicated to any prospective employer or had any effect whatsoever on any job opportunity. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found such facts. In fact, the evidence showed affirmatively that the respondent obtained a much better job at a substantially increased salary over her pay with the Guilford County Sheriff's Department. (During the course of the trial, the trial judge stated: "A note of humor, if I might - it looks like the other side might have

counterclaimed for betterment. Ms. Small has a job now where she doesn't have to go the rigors of what law enforcement people have to do at a much greater salary, and you often wonder about your life - things that look like they are disastrous often are stepping stones.")

Based on the above, it is submitted that the respondent failed to prove an essential element of her case and that the judgment is therefore improper and cannot stand. Logic and justice require that before a plaintiff be awarded substantial damages for a "stigmatization", he be required to prove that his character and reputation has suffered some injury or that some job opportunity has been effected. It is respectfully submitted that this Court has not addressed itself to the question of what a plaintiff must prove to make out a case where it is contended that a public employer has allegedly created and disseminated a false and defamatory impression about the plaintiff in connection with his termination without a hearing and that the Court should grant a writ of certiorari in this case in order to consider the issue.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY RENDERED A JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE ON A THEORY NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES IN THEIR PLEADINGS OR PROOF OR LITIGATED BY THE PARTIES BY CONSENT AND, IN ANY EVENT, FAILED TO FIND SUFFICIENT FACTS TO SUPPORT ITS JUDGMENT, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT AFTER MAKING ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT NOT FOUND BY THE DISTRICT COURT.

One thing is abundantly clear in this case. The trial court decided the case on a

wholly different theory from that which was raised by the pleadings and evidence and argued at the trial. The respondent's complaint plainly stated a cause of action based on racial discrimination. In fact, the verified complaint alleged that the respondent was "summarily discharged, without notice, hearing or statement of reasons." The respondent then went further and alleged that she was informed and believed that her dismissal was "because of her race and color." There was no allegation concerning any reason for her discharge other than race. There was no allegation that the reasons for her dismissal were stigmatizing. There was no allegation that her character and reputation or standing in the community had been damaged. There was no allegation that any job opportunities had been foreclosed. There was no allegation of any publication of the reasons for her discharge. The trial briefs of the parties were directed to the point of racial discrimination. All of the evidence at the trial was directed to the point of whether the respondent was discharged because she was black. The arguments of counsel at the trial were directed to the point of racial discrimination. The respondent's entire presentation of evidence was directed to the point of showing that the reasons given by the petitioner for the dismissal were a mere subterfuge and that the real reason was race. After all of this, however, the Court decided the case for the respondent on the legal theory that the respondent's due process rights to notice in a hearing were abridged. This point was never raised by the parties in their pleadings or proof.

It is submitted that Codd v. Velger, supra, stands for the proposition that a plaintiff in a case such as this must allege and prove each element of his case. In the present case the plaintiff failed to allege any

element of her case except that she was discharged and that she had no hearing. It is submitted that such an omission is fatal.

In the leading case of Sylvan Beach, Inc., v. Koch, 140 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1944) the Court stated that:

"A Court may not, without the consent of all persons affected, enter a judgment which goes beyond the claim asserted in the pleadings. Unless all parties in interest are in Court and have voluntarily litigated some issue not within the pleadings, the Court can consider only the issues made by the pleadings, and the judgment may not extend beyond such issues nor beyond the scope of relief sought. . .

"The foregoing rules are fundamental and state nothing more than the essentials of due process and fair play. They insure to every person his day in Court before a judgment is pronounced against him." Sylvan Beach, Inc., v. Koch, supra, at 861.

It is submitted that the petitioner was not given his day in Court in this case on the question of whether the requirements of notice and a hearing under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution had any application to the respondent.

In its opinion, the District Court stated that:

"The contentions in the pleadings, testimony at trial and the arguments in the trial briefs and

proposed findings focused primarily on the issue of whether plaintiff was discharged because of her race. However, the complaint, the evidence at trial and, to a certain extent, the briefs of the parties raised and discussed the issue of whether plaintiff was entitled to and did receive adequate notice and an opportunity for a hearing before she was discharged. While it would have been preferable to have the due process issue of notice and hearing more fully litigated and while this Court does not wish to stray too far from the procedural addage of 'ain't no allegata without probata and no probata without allegata' by ruling on issues not raised by the parties themselves, there is sufficient evidence to warrant findings of fact and conclusions of law to be made on both the race and the due process issue." (p.A-1)

As shown above, the District Court recognized that the theory upon which it decided the case was not raised by the parties. The petitioner was not prepared to litigate and did not litigate the question of whether or not the respondent was entitled to notice and a hearing under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The petitioner had no notice that any such issue was to be litigated. He was given no opportunity to prepare for and defend against any such issue. Had the petitioner been on notice that the issue was to be litigated, the presentation of his evidence, the cross-examination of the respondent's witnesses, and the legal authority brought to bear on the case would have been entirely different. It is submitted that it is fundamentally unfair to the petitioner to

have litigated a case based on racial discrimination, conclusively showed that no such discrimination existed, and then have a judgment entered against him based on a wholly different legal theory. It is submitted that the judgment of the District Court, for this reason, is erroneous, improper and cannot be sustained.

Even assuming, however, that the respondent's allegations and evidence were sufficient to raise an issue as to her entitlement to a hearing, the District Court's findings of fact are insufficient to support a judgment for the respondent based on that theory. In Codd v. Velger, supra, it is held that in cases such as this when the respondent has no Fourteenth Amendment property interest in her job, "[o]nly if the employer creates and disseminates a false and defamatory impression about the employee in connection with his termination (emphasis added) is such a hearing required." Here the District Court's judgment fails to make any findings concerning any publication of the reasons for the respondent's dismissal. It fails to make any findings concerning the truth or falsity of the charges leading to the dismissal. It fails to make any findings concerning whether the respondent's reputation or associations in the community were damaged. It fails to find that any job opportunities were affected or foreclosed. Absent such findings, it is submitted that the judgment is fatally defective and cannot stand.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, not only did the Court not reverse the District Court on the grounds that the facts found did not support the judgment, it proceeded to make a new and additional finding of fact that the petitioner had published the reasons for the respondent's dismissal and then, based on that,

affirmed the District Court's decision. Thereafter, the respondent petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted and the Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to that Court for further consideration in light of Codd v. Velger, supra. (A-12). On remand, the Court of Appeals made another finding of fact and reaffirmed its previous judgment. This time it found that there was a substantial factual dispute as to the truth and falsity of the reasons for respondent's termination. There was no finding that the charges were actually false, as Codd v. Velger, supra, seems to require - merely that the respondent contended that they were false. It is submitted that in making the above factual findings, the Court of Appeals clearly exceeded its authority. It is not the place of an Appellate Court to sit as the finder of fact in a case. United States v. Jacques, 463 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1972); cf Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If the facts found by the trial court are not sufficient to support the judgment, the judgment may not stand. This is precisely the situation in this case.

Even if, however, the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals in its two opinions were justified and proper, there are still insufficient findings to justify and support the judgment. There is still no finding as to the truth or falsity of the charges. There is no finding concerning any damage to the respondent's reputation or standing in the community. There is no finding with respect to the foreclosure of any job opportunities. Therefore, even with the Court of Appeals' findings of fact, the judgment remains fatally deficient.

Based on the foregoing, it is submitted that the District Court has failed to find

facts sufficient to support its judgment under the requirements set forth in Codd v. Velger, supra. Further, the Court of Appeals has erroneously exceeded its authority by making findings of fact, and, in any event, has failed to properly apply the principles set forth in the Codd case on remand from this Court. It is respectfully submitted that this Court should grant a writ of certiorari in order to correct the erroneous application of the law by the District Court and the Court of Appeals and to correct the Court of Appeals' erroneous application of its powers.

CONCLUSION

Based on all of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted, that this case contains legal issues of sufficient significance to justify and require the consideration and decision of this Court and that a Writ of Certiorari should issue.

Respectfully submitted,

William L. Daisy, Asst. Guilford
County Attorney, Attorney for
Petitioner

OF COUNSEL:

William B. Trevorrow
Guilford County Attorney
Post Office Box 3427
Greensboro, North Carolina 27402
Telephone: 919-373-3852

Perry C. Henson, Attorney for Petitioner

Ronald G. Baker, Attorney for Petitioner

OF COUNSEL:

Henson & Donahue
Post Office Box 3525
Greensboro, North Carolina 27402
Telephone: 919-275-0587

APPENDIX

A-1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
GREENSBORO DIVISION

VOULYNNE SMALL,)	
Plaintiff)	
)	
v.)	NO. C-412-G-73
)	
PAUL H. GIBSON, Sheriff)	
of Guilford County,)	
Defendant)	

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND OPINION

GORDON, Chief Judge

In this case, the plaintiff challenges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) her discharge from employment as female juvenile detective with the Guilford County, North Carolina, Sheriff's Department. The plaintiff seeks to recover back pay from the date of her discharge and attorney's fees.¹ Before commencing a discussion of the facts in this case, a few comments concerning the procedural development of this case and the focus of this opinion are in order. The contentions in the pleadings, testimony at trial and the arguments in the trial briefs and proposed findings focused primarily on the issue of whether plaintiff was discharged because of her race. However, the complaint, the evidence at trial and, to a certain extent, the briefs of the parties raised and discussed the issue of whether plaintiff was entitled to and did receive adequate notice and an opportunity for a hearing before she was discharged. While it would have been preferable to have the due process issue of notice and hearing more fully litigated and while the Court does not wish to stray too far from the procedural adage of "ain't no allegata without probata and no probata without allegata" by ruling on issues not raised by the parties themselves, there is sufficient evidence to warrant findings of fact and conclusions of law to be made on both

¹The plaintiff originally sought reinstatement to her position as female juvenile officer but no longer seeks this relief because she has found preferable and satisfactory employment elsewhere.

the race and the due process issue. See *Jurinko v. Edwin L. Weigand Co.*, 477 F.2d 1038, 1045 (3rd. Cir. 1973). In fact, any other course of action would be an abrogation of the Court's judicial duty in light of the evidence in this case.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Defendant hired plaintiff for the position of female juvenile detective at a salary of \$573.00 per month on January 8, 1973.

2. At the time of hiring plaintiff was provided with a copy of an employee's manual, which was in force during the time of her employment. This manual contained General Order No. 71-2, which provides among other things:

"No member of the Sheriff's Department, on duty or not shall act in any manner to bring reproach upon the Department, or Guilford County. Each deputy is to live a quiet, civil, and orderly life, standing as an example to all citizens. He shall not disturb the peace, become engaged in a brawl, fight, or assault, whereby discredit is caused the Law Enforcement Profession . . . Any deputy or member of the Department while on duty or in uniform shall not consume any whiskey, wine, beer, or other intoxicants except in the line of duty. He will not report for duty having the odor or evidence of having recently consumed any intoxicating substance. Disciplinary action shall be effected immediately by any commanding officer of the Department."

Defendant interprets and applies the provisions of General Order No. 71-2 to the effect that social drinking or moderate consumption of alcoholic beverages, not during duty hours, is permissible.

3. Plaintiff was assigned to defendant's department in a training status. She did not have any arrests, investigation, or other substantial law enforcement duties to perform during her period of employment.

4. On February 5, 1973, plaintiff, as a part of her duties as a deputy sheriff, entered a two week school on narcotics and drugs at Guilford Technical Institute. While attending this school, plaintiff

became acquainted with Purvis Rogers and Joseph Buck, members of the New Bern, North Carolina, Police Department, who were also students in the course.

5. On February 6, 1973, plaintiff had lunch with Messrs. Rogers and Buck.

6. By prearrangement on February 7, 1973, at about 10:00 P.M., plaintiff and Guilford County Sheriff's Deputy Harry Knight went to the room of Messrs. Rogers and Buck at Holiday Inn Four Seasons. The four of them remained in the motel room until about 12:30 A. M. During this time Messrs. Rogers and Buck consumed moderate amounts of alcohol. While the plaintiff denies that she had anything to drink, Mr. Knight testified that during the course of the evening plaintiff drank to the point of being under the influence. The door of the motel room was left open during at least a portion of the time of the visit. On this occasion, the four officers discussed law enforcement matters, carried on casual conversation, and watched television. Plaintiff and Mr. Knight drove back together to Mr. Knight's car, and then plaintiff drove home.

7. On February 8, 1973, plaintiff again met Messrs. Rogers and Buck at their motel room. She went to a friend's house and to dinner with Mr. Rogers, and returned with him to the motel room at about 7:30 or 8:00 P. M. They were expecting Mr. Knight to join them again. However, he called at about 9:00 P. M. to say that he was tied up in an investigation and would not be able to meet them. On this occasion Messrs. Rogers and Buck again consumed alcoholic beverages, but plaintiff contends she did not. Again the evidence is that the door to the motel room was left open.

8. Both Messrs. Rogers and Buck are married men. Plaintiff was and is single.

9. On February 8 and 9, 1973, Deputy Sheriff Harry Knight reported to his supervisors and to defendant that he had accompanied plaintiff to the motel room occupied by the officers from New Bern on the first night and had by telephone ascertained plaintiff's presence in the room on the second night. Mr. Knight stated to his supervisor and to defendant that plaintiff consumed alcoholic beverages on these occasions and in his opinion had become intoxicated, and that when Mr. Buck was away from the

room Mr. Rogers attempted to talk Mr. Knight into leaving him alone with plaintiff. After seeing an automobile that resembled plaintiff's in the Holiday Inn parking lot between 2:00 and 3:00 A.M., on February 9, but without ascertaining the identification or registration of this vehicle, Mr. Knight expressed his opinion to his supervisors and to defendant that this was plaintiff's vehicle.

10. During the time of her employment with defendant, plaintiff was regularly dating Jerry Brown. Mr. Brown was married, but had been separated from his wife for several months. Deputy Sheriff Knight also reported to defendant that plaintiff was regularly going out with a married man who was living with his wife.

11. Defendant believed the report received from Deputy Sheriff Knight. He instructed his administrative assistant, Cecil Webster, on February 9, 1973, to discharge the plaintiff.

12. Mr. Webster called the plaintiff into his office on February 9 and discussed with her the situation at the motel with the policemen from New Bern, reports she was dating a married man and reports of her intoxication. Mr. Webster informed her that her employment was terminated.

13. The plaintiff then saw Sheriff Gibson who confronted her with Deputy Knight's reports about her drinking and dating married men and informed her that her employment was terminated. Sheriff Gibson's reasons for discharging plaintiff was that she had become intoxicated and that she engaged in immoral conduct with married men.

14. During the five years preceding March 29, 1974, four Sheriff's Deputies, all white, were discharged by defendant for violating General Order No. 71-2 with respect to the use of intoxicants. One of the individuals was arrested for public drunkenness and disorderly conduct, and another was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. Two of the individuals were observed to be under the influence of alcohol while on the job, with this condition adversely affecting their work. During the same period four Sheriff's Deputies were discharged by defendant for sexual immorality in violation of the same General Order. All four of these persons either had lived with or spent the night with persons of the opposite sex to whom they were not married. All of the deputies discharged on these grounds were white.

15. In April, 1973, a black person was hired as a replacement for plaintiff by Sheriff Gibson from a group of white and black applicants.

16. Deputy Knight, whose investigation and report formed the basis for plaintiff's discharge, is black.

17. Following her discharge, plaintiff commenced making diligent and good faith efforts to secure new employment. In May, 1974, she was hired as a counselor in a technical institute at a salary substantially higher than the salary she received while in defendant's employ. Prior to obtaining this position, plaintiff worked on and completed her master's degree, and maintained two jobs. She was employed by A & T State University as a research assistant from September, 1973, to May, 1974, at the rate of \$277.00 per month; and she was employed by Sears, Roebuck & Company, where she earned an average of \$225.00 per month from September through December, 1973. In addition plaintiff drew unemployment compensation for a period of six weeks totaling \$250.00. Plaintiff attended summer school at North Carolina A & T State University during the summer of 1973 carrying two courses.

18. Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against defendant with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission by letter dated April 10, 1973. By two subsequent letters, her attorney made inquiry of the Charlotte District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as to the status of her claim. No acknowledgement of the charge of discrimination or of the letters of inquiry, and no other communications of any kind were received by plaintiff or her attorney from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission prior to the date on which this action was commenced.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Since the plaintiff was discharged for alleged intoxication and immoral conduct, her termination was based on reasons which would tend to damage her standing and associations in her community by tarnishing her reputation and good name. Termination for these reasons would also impose on plaintiff a stigma or employment record that would foreclose her freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to notice of the reasons for discharge and the opportunity for a hearing to refute the charges. *Bd. of Regents v. Roth*, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).

2. The undisputed series of events leading up to plaintiff's discharge (Findings of Fact Nos. 6, 10, 11, 12, 13) demonstrate that plaintiff was given neither adequate notice nor an opportunity for a hearing. This failure constitutes a violation of due process and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 entitling plaintiff to an award of back pay. *Horton v. Orange County Bd. of Educ.*, 464 F.2d 536, 538 (4th Cir. 1972).

3. Plaintiff exhausted all of her administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

4. Plaintiff's allegation of racial discrimination in her discharge is not supported by the evidence. It is undisputed that plaintiff was discharged for allegations of intoxication and immoral conduct, which are racially neutral standards in themselves. Furthermore, the evidence that white employees had been discharged under this same provision (General Order No. 71-2) for conduct more reproachable or deplorable than plaintiff's conduct, as reported by Deputy Knight, does not alone establish that defendant employed a more arbitrary or rigorous application of the General Order to black employees than white. On the contrary, this evidence manifests the use of General Order 71-2 primarily against white employees and not as an instrument which either intentionally discriminates or has the effect of discriminating against blacks. *Compare United States v. Chesterfield City, School Dist.*, 484 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1973).

5. The plaintiff has presented some evidence that the Sheriff's Department has hired a disproportionately low number of blacks, that blacks are underrepresented in preferred and prestigious positions and that more rigorous standards are applied in selecting black employees than whites. This evidence has been denied. However, regardless of whose version of these facts the Court accepts, there is simply no evidence to support the contention that plaintiff's discharge was because of her race. Even if the plaintiff has demonstrated a pattern of racial discrimination or statistical evidence of past discriminatory employment practices, there is no evidence that General Order 71-2 has been used in the past or was used in this case to discharge plaintiff because she was black, rather the evidence is to the contrary. *See Cannady v. Person Cry. Bd. of Educ.*, 375 F.Supp. 689, 696-97 (M.D.N.C. 1974).

6. The Court concludes that in light of the ostensibly neutral standard by which the plaintiff was judged (General Order 71-2), the evidence that this standard has been applied in a manner which has *not* been discriminatory toward blacks, the fact that plaintiff was replaced by a black and the fact that a black, Deputy Knight, was the main investigating officer in plaintiff's case, plaintiff's discharge was not racially motivated and no violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is found.

7. The Court finds that plaintiff was not afforded adequate notice or an opportunity for a hearing prior to discharge in violation of plaintiff's due process rights and her rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

RELIEF

1. There is no need for a ruling on plaintiff's right to reinstatement since she no longer seeks that remedy. Therefore, it is unnecessary for the Court to decide whether her discharge pursuant to General Order 71-2 was proper. *See Horton*, 464 F.2d at 537.

2. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of back pay as female juvenile officer in the amount of \$4,092.00. This award requires the Court to set forth certain subsidiary findings and computations supporting the award in compliance with *O'Neal v. Gresham*, Civil No. 74-2030, 74-2031 (4th Cir., decided July 8, 1975).

- a. The parties agree and the Court finds that plaintiff, following her discharge, commenced making diligent and good faith efforts to secure new employment.
- b. Plaintiff at all times prior to December 31, 1973, made a reasonable effort to mitigate her damages by holding down one, and for a few months, two jobs, while working toward completing her masters degree at North Carolina A & T State University.

- c. While there is evidence that plaintiff attended summer school in 1973 when she might have been employed, the Court cannot say that this was a violation of her duty to mitigate damages. The summer courses were directed toward securing her master's degree. Moreover, she qualified for unemployment compensation for those six weeks of summer school, a fact which is further evidence that she was not avoiding employment. The unemployment compensation received for those six weeks will be deducted from the back pay award. *Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.*, 346 F.Supp. 1301, 1309 (S.D.Fla. 1972).
- d. There is no evidence that the plaintiff was ever offered employment which she declined to accept. However, there is evidence that during the period January 1, 1974, to May 1, 1974, she continued to actively pursue studies leading to completion of her work to secure a master's degree, which degree was awarded in May, 1974, while abandoning, in part, her efforts to maintain employment in a manner which would fully minimize her loss of salary by reason of her discharge.
- e. Therefore, the Court cannot find and conclude that a diligent and good faith effort was made to fully mitigate her damages during this period and, therefore, concludes that for the period January 1, 1974, to May 1, 1974, no back pay should be awarded. See *Brito v. Zia Co.*, 478 F.2d 1200, 1204 (10th Cir. 1973); *Jurinko v. Edwin L. Weigand Co.*, 477 F.2d 1038, 1046 (3d. Cir. 1973).
- f. On May 1, 1974, the plaintiff obtained employment at a salary of \$11,076.00 per annum, substantially higher than she was paid by the defendant, and thus is not entitled to consideration for back pay after May 1, 1974.
3. All of plaintiff's earnings from the time of discharge in February, 1973, to December 31, 1973, will be deducted from the back pay award. *Jannetta v. Cole*, 493 F.2d 1334, 1338 (4th Cir. 1974).

4. The back pay award is arrived at by the following computations.

- a. Feb. 9, 1973 (date of discharge to August 31, 1973):
 6 months & 19 days at \$573.00 per month
 $6 \times \$573.00 = \3438.00
 $19/28 \times \$573.00 = \389.00
 $\$3438.00 + \$389.00 = \$3827.00$
 $\$3827.00 - \250.00 (unemployment compensation for 6 weeks in summer 1973) = $\$3577.00$
- b. Sept. 1, 1973, to Dec. 31, 1973 (4 months): $\$573.00$ (monthly salary with defendant) $\times 4 = \$2292.00$
 Subtract the following earnings:
 (i) Sept. 1973 to Dec. 31, 1973 — employment at Sears, Roebuck & Co. at \$225.00 per month — $4 \times \$225.00 = \900.00
 (ii) Sept. 1973, to Dec. 31, 1973 — employment at A & T State University at \$277.00 per month — $4 \times \$277.00 = \1108.00
 Sum of (i) and (ii) = $\$900.00 + \$1108.00 = \$2008.00$
 $\$2292.00$ (what she would have earned — back pay award) — $\$2008.00$ (what she did earn) = $\$284.00$
 $\$3577.00 + \$284.00 = \$3861.00$. Interest (at 6%) on $\$3861.00 = \231.66
TOTAL BACK PAY AWARD — $\$3861.00 + \$231.66 = \$4092.66$

5. The plaintiff is denied her request for attorney's fees. Such denial is clearly required in this action. *Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y.*, 42 U.S.L.W. 4561 (decided May 12, 1975); accord *O'Neal v. Gresham, supra*, at 7.

Accordingly, a judgment will be entered.

August 15, 1975

s/ Eugene A. Gordon
 United States District Judge
 A True Copy
 Teste:
 Carmon J. Stuart, Clerk
 By: _____
 Deputy Clerk

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT**

Voulynnne Small,

Appellee,

versus

Paul H. Gibson, Sheriff
of Guilford County,

Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District
of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Eugene A. Gordon, District
Judge.

Argued March 29, 1976

Decided Sept. 17, 1976

Before HAYNESWORTH, Chief Judge,
WINTER and BUTZNER, Circuit Judges

Perry C. Henson (Ronald G. Baker, Henson, Donahue & Elrod, W.
B. Trevorrow, County Attorney, William L. Daisy, Assistant
County Attorney, Guilford County Attorney's Office on brief) for
Appellant; Norman B. Smith (Smith, Patterson, Follin, Curtis &
James on brief) for Appellee.

PER CURIAM:

Voulynnne Small, a black female deputy sheriff trainee, was
discharged by the Sheriff of Guilford County for intoxication and
immoral conduct. The Sheriff told the Chief of Police of New Bern,
North Carolina, that Small had engaged in immoral behavior with
two men. Whenever anyone asked him why he fired Small, he
responded that he did it "on account of drinking and on account of
being in a motel room with men." Although termination under these
circumstances obviously foreclosed certain employment oppor-
tunities, she was provided no notice of the reasons for discharge and
was given no opportunity for a hearing in which she could attempt to
refute the charges. She was deprived of due process by not receiving

that to which she was entitled — notice and a hearing. Therefore,
the district court awarded her damages.

The Sheriff appeals from the judgment. We find his appeal to
be without merit. The Supreme Court recently said in *Bishop v.
Wood*, 44 U.S.L.W. 4820 (U. S. June 10, 1976), that no liberty
interest was infringed and no hearing required when the reasons for
discharge of a state employee were not made public, even if those
reasons were false and even if they would stigmatize him. The Court
reasoned that if the reasons were not made public, no stigma could
result, no matter how serious or how false the grounds for
discharge. This case is different; here, the Sheriff publicized his
reasons.

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED.

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT**

Voulynnne Small,

Appellee,

versus

Paul H. Gibson, Sheriff
of Guilford County,

Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing, no request for
a poll of the court being made on the suggestion for rehearing *en
banc*, and with the concurrence of Judge Winter and Judge Butzner,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition be, and the same is hereby,
denied.

s/ Clement Haynsworth, Jr.

Chief Judge, Fourth Circuit

October 21, 1976

A-12

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 76-941

PAUL H. GIBSON, SHERIFF OF GUILFORD COUNTY

Petitioner

vs.

VOULYNNE SMALL,

Respondent

ORDER

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for further consideration in light of Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. ____ (1977).

A-13

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 75-2170

Voulynne Small,

Appellee,

versus

Paul H. Gibson, Sheriff
of Guilford County,

Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Eugene A. Gordon, District Judge.

Argued March 29, 1976

Decided June 22, 1977

Before HAYNESWORTH, Chief Judge,
WINTER AND BUTZNER, Circuit Judges

Perry C. Henson (Ronald G. Baker, Henson, Donahue & Elrod, W. B. Trevorow, County Attorney, William L. Daisy, Assistant County Attorney, Guilford County Attorney's Office on brief) for Appellant; Norman B. Smith (Smith, Patterson, Follin, Curtis & James on brief) for Appellee.

PER CURIAM:

On February 28, 1977 the Supreme Court of the United States entered an order vacating the earlier judgment of this court and remanding the case to this court for further consideration in light of Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. _____ (1977). In Codd the Supreme Court held that a policeman allegedly discharged for a stated reason was not entitled to an administrative hearing if he did not deny the truth of the allegedly stigmatizing cause of discharge. The purpose of providing an administrative hearing, of course, is to get the truth of the matter and to afford the public employee an opportunity to clear his name with an incidental consequence of reinstatement of employment. If the stated cause of discharge is not stigmatizing or if there is no dispute about its truth and accuracy, there is no need for a hearing to determine what the true factual situation is.

In this case, the plaintiff, Small, was an untenured deputy sheriff trainee. She was discharged because, as the sheriff reported to those who inquired of him, she had been drinking and consorting with married men in a motel room. The district judge found the statement stigmatizing. We agree.

In our prior opinion, we did not address the presence of any factual dispute about the truth of the charge, but the record does disclose a substantial denial of it by the plaintiff. She said that she had been in a motel room with two visiting police officers but that the door to the room had been left open and that she had had nothing to drink. While she conceded presence in the room, in effect she controverted all of the adverse implications of the sheriff's statements and all wrongdoing.*

Since there was a live dispute about the truth of the charges upon the basis of which she was discharged, we adhere to our former opinion that we was entitled to an administrative hearing at which she should have been afforded an opportunity to establish the essential falsity of the sheriff's accusation.

AFFIRMED.

* Perhaps it would not have sufficed had she only denied participation in sexual activity and drinking. Her claim that the door was wide open, however, negatives the suspicions which might have persisted had the conduct of the occupants of the room been open to observation by no one else. Thus, had she secluded herself in a closed bedroom with the two visiting policemen, that might have warranted the release of this probationary policewoman and generally warranted the sheriff's formulation of the reason for his action; association under readily visible circumstances, however, would present no discernible cause for termination, and a statement of the fact would not be stigmatizing.